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Epistemic planning can be used for decision making in multi-agent situations with distributed knowl-
edge and capabilities. Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) has been shown to provide a very natural and
expressive framework for epistemic planning. In this paper, we aim to give an accessible introduction
to DEL-based epistemic planning. The paper starts with the most classical framework for planning,
STRIPS, and then moves towards epistemic planning in a number of smaller steps, where each step
is motivated by the need to be able to model more complex planning scenarios.
1 Introduction
Automated planning is a branch of artificial intelligence concerned with computing plans (sequences of
actions) leading to some desired goal. A human or robot could e.g. have the goal of picking up a parcel
at the post office, and then the problem becomes to find a succesful sequence of actions achieving this.
Epistemic planning is the enrichment of planning with epistemic notions, that is, knowledge and beliefs.
The human or robot might have to reason about epistemic aspects such as: Do I know at which post
office the parcel is? If not, who would be relevant to ask? Maybe the parcel is a birthday present for
my daughter, and I want to ensure that she doesnt get to know, and have to plan my actions accordingly
(make sure she doesn’t see me with the parcel). The epistemic notions are usually formalised using an
epistemic logic. Epistemic planning can naturally be seen as the combination of automated planning
with epistemic logic, relying on ideas, concepts and solutions from both areas.
In general, epistemic planning considers the following problem: Given my current state of knowl-
edge, and a desirable state of knowledge, how do I get from one to the other? It is of central importance
in settings where agents need to be able to reason about their own lack of knowledge, and e.g. make plans
of how to achieve the required knowledge. It is also essential in multi-agent planning, where succesful
coordination and collaboration can only be expected if agents are able to reason about the knowledge,
uncertainty and capabilities of the other agents.
In this gentle introduction to epistemic planning, the focus will be on the DEL approach: Using Dy-
namic Epistemic Logic (DEL) as the underlying formalism. We start with the most classical framework
for planning, STRIPS, and then stepwise we expand and generalise the framework until finally reaching
full multi-agent planning based on dynamic epistemic logic. Each of these steps will be based on the
need to be able to formalise specific planning scenarios.
In Section 2 we will first introduce classical planning domains and planning tasks. Then we move to
present the basics of the STRIPS planning framework in Section 3, and propositional planning in Sec-
tion 4. We then slowly progress towards defining the epistemic planning framework via first defining
belief states and conditional actions in Section 5, and then epistemic logic and dynamic epistemic logic
in Sections 6–7. In Section 8 we finally define epistemic planning tasks, and study various extensions
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and generalisations in Sections 9–11. In Section 12 we very briefly study complexity issues of epis-
temic planning, and we round off with a discussion of alternative approaches to epistemic planning in
Section 13.
2 Classical planning domains and planning tasks
Example 1. Suppose a father has his daughter’s birthday coming up, and he ordered a present for her
which is now at the post office. His goal is to be able to give her the present the next day. This is a
planning task (sometimes called a planning problem): He needs to compute a plan to achieve the goal.
In a planning task, one is given an initial state, a set of goal states and a set of available actions. The
problem is now to compute a sequence of actions (a plan) that, if executed in the initial state, will lead to
one of the goal states. In the birthday present example, the initial state describes that the present is at the
post office and not yet wrapped. The goal states are those in which the present is at home and wrapped
(ready to be given on the next day). The available actions could be actions like going from home to the
post office, going from the post office to home, picking up the present at the post office, and wrapping
the present. Of course we do not need to limit ourselves to only allowing these specific actions, but could
have general actions for going from a location A to a location B, general actions for picking up an object
at a location, and general actions for wrapping an object that you are currently holding.
To allow us to reason formally about planning tasks and plans, and to allow computers and robots to
compute plans, we need an appropriate formalism to describe such objects. The simplest approach is to
define planning tasks in terms of state-transition systems.
Definition 1. [17] A (restricted) state-transition system (also called a classical planning domain or
simply a state space) is Σ= (S,A,γ) where:
• S is a finite or recursively enumerable set of states.
• A is a finite or recursively enumerable set of actions.
• γ : S×A ↪→ S is a computable partial state-transition function.
When γ(s,a) is defined, a is said to be applicable in s. When pi = a1; · · · ;an is a sequence of actions
from A, we write γ(s,pi) for γ(. . .γ(γ(γ(s,a1),a2),a3), . . . ,an).1
Definition 2. [17] A classical planning task is a triple (Σ,s0,Sg) where:
• Σ= (S,A,γ) is a state-transition system (a classical planning domain).
• s0 ∈ S is the initial state.
• Sg ⊆ S is the set of goal states.
A solution to a classical planning task ((S,A,γ),s0,Sg) is a finite sequence of actions (a plan) pi =
a1; · · · ;an from A such that γ(s0,pi) ∈ Sg. The length of a solution pi is the number of actions in pi .
Example 2. Consider the birthday present example from Example 1. The available actions and their
corresponding state transitions could be presented by the state-transitions system of Figure 1. Here
we have Σ = (S,A,γ) with S = {s1,s2,s3,s4,s5,s6}, A = {go to post office, go home, pick up present,
wrap present}, and γ is as given in the figure (e.g. γ(s1,go to post office) = s2 since there is an edge
labelled “go to post office” from s1 to s2). Note that “wrap present” is only applicable after “pick
up present” has been executed: it is necessary to get hold of the present before it can be wrapped. The
1So γ(s,pi) is the result of executing the actions of pi in sequence starting in s.
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s1
go home
s2
go to post office
go home
s3pick up present
go to post office
s4
go home
go home
go to post office
s5
go home
wrap present
s6
wrap present
go to post office
go home
go to post office
Figure 1: A state-transition system for the birthday present example.
planning task of Example 1 can then be represented as the classical planning task (Σ,s0,Sg) where s0 = s1
and Sg = {s5}. A solution is highlighted in Figure 1:
pi = go to post office;pick up present;go home;wrap present.
Representing planning tasks directly as state-transition systems has some important weaknesses:
1) there is no internal structure on states and actions to understand or clarify what they represent; 2) state-
transition systems are normally of exponential size in the number of propositional variables required to
describe the states. To exemplify the second weakness, if the planning task was to take home n parcels
from the post office, the state space (state-transition system) would be of size ≥ 2n: each parcel could
either be at the post office or at home. This is so even though the length of the shortest solution would
only be linear in n (e.g. bring the parcels home one at a time). To address both of these weaknesses one
introduces logical structures on states and actions. This is e.g. done in the planning language STRIPS to
be introduced next.
3 STRIPS planning
The classical language for describing states and actions in the field of automated planning is STRIPS [16].
We will here introduce STRIPS slightly informally, and the interested reader is referred to [29] for more
details. The reader familiar with STRIPS planning can skip this section, but might want to briefly look
at the examples.
In STRIPS, states are represented as sets of ground atoms of a function-free first-order language L.
In the birthday present example, the initial state could e.g. be described by
s0 = {At(Father,Home),At(Present,PostOffice), IsAgent(Father), IsLocation(Home),
IsLocation(PostOffice), IsObject(Present)} (1)
where At(x,y) is a predicate for expressing that object (or agent) x is at location y. The predicates
IsAgent(x), IsLocation(x) and IsObject(x) are true of agents, objects and locations, respectively (alterna-
tively, one could use a sorted first-order language and then omit these predicates). Actions are described
via so-called action schemas. The actions of going from one location to another, picking up an object
and wrapping an object can be expressed by the STRIPS action schemas provided in Figure 2, where
predicates have names starting with upper-case letters, and variables have names starting with lower-
case letters. Each action schema has a name, a precondition and an effect. Preconditions and effects
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ACTION : Go(agt, from, to)
PRECOND : At(agt, from)∧ IsAgent(agt)∧ IsLocation(from)∧ IsLocation(to)
EFFECT : At(agt, to)∧¬At(agt, from)
ACTION : PickUp(agt,obj, from)
PRECOND : At(agt, from)∧At(obj, from)∧¬Has(agt,obj)∧ IsAgent(agt)∧ IsObject(obj)∧ IsLocation(from)
EFFECT : Has(agt,obj)∧¬At(obj, from)
ACTION : Wrap(agt,obj)
PRECOND : Has(agt,obj)∧¬Wrapped(obj)∧ IsAgent(agt)∧ IsObject(obj)
EFFECT : Wrapped(obj)
Figure 2: The set of STRIPS action schemas for the birthday present example.
are conjunctions of literals of the first-order language L. A ground action is achieved by instantiating
all variables of an action schema with constants of L. For instance,
ACTION : Go(Father,Home,PostOffice)
PRECOND : At(Father,Home)∧ IsAgent(Father)∧ IsLocation(Home)∧ IsLocation(PostOffice)
EFFECT : At(Father,PostOffice)∧¬At(Father,Home)
The precondition of a ground action describes what has to be true for the action to be applicable.2 It
is easy to check that Go(Father,Home,PostOffice) is applicable in the initial state s0 defined by (1)
(all precondition atoms of the action occur in s0). The effect of a ground action describes how the
state is modified when the action is executed. The effect of Go(Father,Home,PostOffice) expresses
that At(Father,PostOffice) becomes true, and that At(Father,Home) becomes false. Hence the result of
executing Go(Father,Home,PostOffice) in s0 will be the state
s1 = {At(Father,PostOffice),At(Present,PostOffice), IsAgent(Father), IsLocation(Home),
IsLocation(PostOffice), IsObject(Present)}
Any finite set of STRIPS action schemas A induce a state-transition system (classical planning do-
main) Σ= (S,A′,γ) by:
• S = 2P, where P is the set of ground atoms of L.
• A′ = {all ground instances of the action schemas in A}
• γ(s,a) =

(s−{ϕ | ¬ϕ is a negative literal of EFFECT(a)) ∪
{ϕ | ϕ is a positive literal of EFFECT(a)} if s |= PRECOND(a)
undefined otherwise
The state-transition system induced by the STRIPS schemas of Figure 2 is provided in Figure 3. The
rigid atoms, those that cannot change truth-value, have been omitted. Furthermore, each constant name
is abbreviated by the capital letters it contains (so for instance PostOffice is abbreviated PO). Note that
2More formally, a ground action a is applicable in a state s if s |= PRECOND(a) where |= denotes semantical entailment on
propositional logic over the set of ground atoms of L.
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At(F,H)
At(P,PO)
Go(F,H,H)
At(F,PO)
At(P,PO)
Go(F,H,PO)
Go(F,PO,H)
At(F,PO)
Has(F,P)
PickUp(F,P,PO)
Go(F,PO,PO)
At(F,H)
Has(F,P)
Go(F,H,H)
Go(F,PO,H)
Go(F,H,PO)
At(F,H)
Has(F,P)
Wrapped(P)
Go(F,H,H)
Wrap(F,P)
At(F,PO)
Has(F,P)
Wrapped(P)
Wrap(F,P) Go(F,PO,PO) Go(F,PO,H)
Go(F,H,PO)
Figure 3: The state-transition system induced by the action schemas of Figure 2.
the resulting state-transition system is isomorphic to the state-transition system of Figure 1.
The advantage of the current STRIPS representation over the previous pure state-transition repre-
sentation is that there is now structure on states and actions. This for instance means that the current
formulation is easily generalisable, e.g. we can add n− 1 additional parcels to the initial state without
any need to modify the underlying action schemas. The induced state-transition system would become
exponentially bigger, as earlier noted, but the size of the STRIPS action schemas would stay the same
(though the size of the description of the initial state would grow linearly with n).
A STRIPS planning task on a function-free first-order language L is (A,s0,ϕg) where A is a set of
STRIPS action schemas over L, s0 is a set of ground atoms over L and ϕg is a conjunction of ground lit-
erals over L called the goal formula. Any STRIPS planning task (A,s0,ϕg) induces a classical planning
task (Σ,s0,Sg) by letting Σ be the state-transition system induced by A and letting Sg = {s ∈ S | s |= ϕg}.
A solution to a STRIPS planning task is then a solution to the induced classical planning task.
Example 3. The birthday present example can be represented as a STRIPS planning task (A,s0,ϕg)
where A is the set of action schemas of Figure 2, s0 is defined by (1), and ϕg = At(Father,Home)∧
Has(Father,Present)∧Wrapped(Present). This is a STRIPS planning task on the function-free first
order languageLwith binary predicate symbols At and Has, unary predicate symbols Wrapped, IsAgent,
IsLocation and IsObject, and constant symbols Home, PostOffice, Father, Present. Consulting Figure 3,
it is easy to show that a solution to this planning task is
pi = Go(Father,Home,PostOffice);PickUp(Father,Present,PostOffice);
Go(Father,PostOffice,Home);Wrap(Father,Present).
In the field of automated planning, actions are always described compactly in an action description
language like STRIPS (or e.g. PDDL, ADL or SAS+). A lot of research effort goes into finding ways
to automatically derive efficient heuristics from action schemas, such that solutions can be found with
minimal search. If given an induced state-transition system of a set of STRIPS action schemas, finding
a solution to a planning task becomes a simple graph search problem (find a path from s0 to a state in
Sg). This can be done in linear time in the size of the state-transition system. However, as earlier noted,
the induced state-transition system is often exponential in the size of the action schemas. Hence the
complexity of computing solutions or deciding whether a solution exists (the plan existence problem)
is in automated planning always measured in the size of the compact action schema representation. This
is different from many formalisms in logic that consider plans or strategies and where complexity is
measured in terms of the size of the state space. This is e.g. why epistemic planning based on ATEL
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in [19] can be claimed to be tractable, even though already basic propositional STRIPS planning, which
is much less expressive, is intractable. For most planning domains considered in automated planning
(e.g. the planning domains of the International Planning Competition, IPC), calculating the entire state-
transition system is computationally infeasible, and the goal is then for the heuristics to be sufficiently
efficient that only the most relevant parts of the state-transition system are explored.
4 Propositional planning tasks
Even though STRIPS action schemas are formulated using first-order logic, for most purposes we can
consider STRIPS as a planning formalism based on propositional logic. To see this, we first define
propositional planning tasks.
Definition 3. A propositional planning task3 on a finite set of atomic propositions P is (A,s0,ϕg) where
• A is a finite set of actions. Each action is a pair a = 〈pre(a), post(a)〉 where pre(a) and post(a)
are conjunctions of propositional literals over P. The element pre(a) is called the precondition of
a and post(a) its postcondition.
• s0 is the initial state, a propositional state over P (a subset of P).4
• ϕg is the goal formula, a propositional formula over P.
A propositional planning task (A,s0,ϕg) on P induces a classical planning task ((S,A,γ),s0,Sg) in
the expected way (compare with the classical planning task induced by a STRIPS planning task defined
in Section 3):
• S = 2P
• γ(s,a) =

(s−{p | ¬p is a negative literal of post(a)) ∪
{p | p is a positive literal of post(a)} if s |= pre(a)
undefined otherwise
• Sg = {s ∈ S | s |= ϕg}.
A solution to a propositional planning task is any solution to the induced classical planning task.
For any function-free first-order language L, let PL denote the set of ground atoms of L. The set
PL can be thought of as the atomic propositions of a propositional language. Any quantifier-free ground
formula of L is then at the same time a formula of propositional logic over PL. Any STRIPS planning
task (A,s0,ϕg) on L induces a propositional planning task (A′,s0,ϕg) on PL by simply letting
A′ = {〈Precond(a),Effect(a)〉 | a is a ground instance of an action schema in A}.
It is easy to show that the STRIPS planning task (A,s0,ϕg) and its induced propositional planning task
(A′,s0,ϕg) both induce the same classical planning task. They thus also have the same solutions. Note
that the conventions for preconditions and effects are a bit different in propositional planning tasks than
in STRIPS planning tasks. We now write precondition and effect pairs of an action a as a pair of the
form 〈pre(a), post(a)〉, where we have also relabelled effects as postconditions. The point of both these
changes is to gradually move away from the classical conventions of STRIPS planning into the conven-
tions of dynamic epistemic logic that we will later present a planning framework based on.
3Called a set-theoretic planning task in [17].
4In general, we will identify propositional states with subsets of P. A subset S ⊆ P represents the propositional state s in
which the elements of S are the atomic propositions true in s.
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Example 4. The birthday present example can be represented as the propositional planning task (A,s0,ϕg)
below. It is a simplified version of the propositional planning task induced by the STRIPS planning task
of Example 3, where we have done away with the rigid atoms that are no longer necessary. In the defi-
nitions below, Agt is a set of agent names (including Father), Loc is a set of locations (including Home
and PostOffice) and Obj is a set of objects (including Present).
• A = {Go(agt, from, to) | agt ∈ Agt & from, to ∈ Loc}∪{PickUp(agt,obj, from) | agt ∈ Agt & obj ∈
Obj & from∈Loc}∪{Wrap(agt,obj) | agt∈Agt &obj∈Obj}where, for all agt∈Agt, all from, to∈
Loc and all obj ∈ Obj,
– Go(agt, from, to) = 〈At(agt, from),At(agt, to)∧¬At(agt, from)〉
– PickUp(agt,obj, from) = 〈At(agt, from)∧At(obj, from)∧¬Has(agt,obj),Has(agt,obj)〉
– Wrap(agt,obj) = 〈Has(agt,obj)∧¬Wrapped(obj),Wrapped(obj)〉.
• s0 = {At(Father,Home),At(Present,PostOffice)}.
• ϕg = At(Father,Home)∧Has(Father,Present)∧Wrapped(Present).
Note that expressions like At(agt, from) with agt∈Agt and from∈ Loc are no longer considered as ground
atoms of the original first-order language L, but as atoms of propositional logic over PL. A solution
to this planning task is exactly as to the original STRIPS version: pi = Go(Father,Home,PostOffice);
PickUp(Father,Present,PostOffice); Go(Father,PostOffice,Home); Wrap(Father,Present).
Since any STRIPS planning task can be propositionalised as above, it means we can now work in
a simpler formalism, propositional logic, which also makes it easier to generalise the formalism to e.g.
planning with partial observability, non-determinism or epistemic planning.5
5 Belief states, partial observability, and conditional actions
Consider the birthday present example formalised as the propositional planning task of Example 4. As-
sume now that there is not only one, but two, local post offices, and the father does not know in which one
the parcel is. We can assume Loc correspondingly contains two constants, PostOffice1 and PostOffice2.
To represent this modified planning task we need two changes in the underlying formalism: belief states
and conditional actions. We need belief states to represent the uncertainty of the agent. A belief state
in this setting is a set of propositional states, that is, a set of subsets of P (where P is the set of atomic
propositions). The initial belief state of our agent is now:
s0 = {{At(Father,Home),At(Present,PostOffice1)},{At(Father,Home),At(Present,PostOffice2)}}. (2)
The state s0 contains two propositional states, where the first one represents the situation where the
present is in PostOffice1, and the second presents the situation where it is in PostOffice2. We define a
propositional formula ϕ to be true in a belief state s, written s |= ϕ , if ϕ is true in all propositional states
of s. Hence we have
(1) s0 |= At(Father,Home)
(2) s0 6|= At(Present,PostOffice1)
5In certain cases the difference between expressing a planning task in the lifted first-order STRIPS representation and its
induced propositionalisation becomes essential: for some of the complexity results measured in the size of the planning tasks;
for practical convenience of representation; or e.g. for learning actions/action models [30, 24]. However, for the purposes of
this paper, the grounded/propositionalised representation is sufficient.
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(3) s0 6|= At(Present,PostOffice2)
(4) s0 |= At(Present,PostOffice1)∨At(Present,PostOffice2).
This represents the internal perspective of the father in the belief state s0: He can verify (knows) that he
is home (1) and can verify (knows) that the present is in PostOffice1 or PostOffice2 (4), but doesn’t know
which (2–3). Planning in the space of belief states rather than propositional states is called planning
under partial observability (and planning on propositional states is then called planning under full
observability). In the following, and in line with modal logic, we will call the elements of belief states
worlds.
To represent the modified example we also need to allow conditional actions. The agent can attempt
to pick up the present at either of the two post offices, but whether he is succesful is conditional on
whether it is the correct one. Symmetric to the generalisation from representing states as subsets of P
to sets of such subsets, we can generalise actions from being pairs 〈pre(a), post(a)〉 to be sets of such
pairs. We can then represent the attempted pickup action by:
TryPickUp(agt,obj, from) = {
〈At(agt, from)∧At(obj, from)∧¬Has(agt,obj),Has(agt,obj)∧¬At(obj, from)〉,
〈At(agt, from)∧¬At(obj, from),>〉
}
(3)
where the postcondition > means that nothing changes. From now on we will, in line with the literature
on dynamic epistemic logic, call pairs 〈pre(e), post(a)〉 events. So a conditional action like the one
above is a set of events: a set of the possible things that might happen when the action is executed. The
TryPickUp action above expresses that if the agent and the object are in the same location, the object will
be successfully picked up (the first event of the action), and otherwise nothing will happen (the second
event of the action).
Given a belief state s represented as a set of worlds and an action action a represented as a set of
events, we can define a generalised transition function by
γ(s,a) = {γ(w,e) | w ∈ s,e ∈ a,w |= pre(e)}.6 (4)
Thus, e.g., where we abbreviate PostOffice1 by PO1, PostOffice2 by PO2 and Home by H:
s1 = γ(s0,Go(Father,H,PO1))
= γ({{At(Father,H),At(Present,PO1)},{At(Father,H),At(Present,PO2)}},Go(Father,H,PO1))
= {{At(Father,PO1),At(Present,PO1)},{At(Father,PO1),At(Present,PO2)}}
s2 = γ(s1,TryPickUp(Father,Present,PO1))
= {{At(Father,PO1),Has(Father,Present)},{At(Father,PO1),At(Present,PO2)}}
s3 = γ(s2,Go(Father,PO1,PO2))
= {{At(Father,PO2),Has(Father,Present)},{At(Father,PO2),At(Present,PO2)}}
s4 = γ(s3,TryPickUp(Father,Present,PO2))
= {{At(Father,PO2),Has(Father,Present)}}
6This is consistent with how the transition function is defined for conditional actions in [17], but only for actions in which
the events have pairwise mutually inconsistent preconditions. If two events have mutually consistent preconditions, it means
there exists states in which both are applicable. This can be interpreted in two ways. Either it represents non-determinism where
only one of the events can actually take place when the action is executed. Or it represents a situation where multiple events
occur in parallel. In [17], the latter interpretation is used. In this paper and in dynamic epistemic logic, the first interpretation is
used.
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s5 = γ(s4,Go(Father,PO2,Home))
= {{At(Father,Home),Has(Father,Present)}}
s6 = γ(s5,Wrap(Father,Present))
= {{At(Father,Home),Has(Father,Present),Wrapped(Present)}}
Note how the belief state goes down from cardinality 2 to cardinality 1 when going from s3 to s4. At plan
time, when deliberating about the possible action sequences, the father doesn’t know whether he will
have the present after having visited only PostOffice1, and he hence has to represent both possibilities.
In s4, however, he knows, even at plan time, that he will have the present, since if he didn’t get it at
PostOffice1, he will be sure to get it at PostOffice2. The calculations above show that a solution to the
modified planning task is
pi = Go(Father,H,PO1);TryPickUp(Father,Present,PO1);Go(Father,PO1,PO2);
TryPickUp(Father,Present,PO2);Go(Father,PO2,Home);Wrap(Father,Present).
(5)
There are, unfortunately, several weaknesses in the current approach. An important weakness is that
the formalism does so far not distinguish between between the kind of uncertainty the father has in s1 and
the kind of uncertainty he has in s2. In s1, the father has run time uncertainty [26] about the location
of the present. This means that even at execution time, when the action Go(Father,H,PO1) has been
executed in the initial state, the father still does not know which of the two worlds of s1 is the actual one.
In s2, however, he should only have plan time uncertainty [26]. This means that when he is deliberating
about the possible action sequences and their potential outcomes, he can not tell which of the two worlds
of s2 is going to be realised, but at execution time he will know. This is because attempting to pick
up the present at PO1 has the side-effect of informing him whether the present is there or not. The
distinction between plan time and run time uncertainty is not represented in our current formalism, since
both kinds of uncertainty are modelled exactly the same: by simply having a set of worlds representing
those situations that the agent cannot distinguish between (whether at plan time or at run time).
The simplest and most common solution to this problem in the automated planning literature (see e.g.
[17, 28]) is to treat observability as a static partition on the set of possible worlds, so that certain possible
worlds are always distinguishable and others never are. What becomes distinguishable at execution time
is then hardcoded into this observability partition. This approach is however insufficient for our purposes.
For instance, assume the present is initially located at PO2. Assume further that the father initially goes
to PO1 to attempt picking it up and then goes home again. Then afterwards he will be in exactly the
same world as initially, namely the world satisfying At(Father,Home)∧At(Present,PO2). But he will
not be in the same information state: He learned that the present is not at PO1 (and therefore also learned
that it must be at PO2). To be able to represent this in an appropriate way we need to take the final step
into planning based on epistemic logic.7
7In principle, in the single-agent case, we could alternatively consider modelling states as sets of sets of worlds (that is,
elements of 22
2P
) and actions a sets of sets of events. In a state {{w11,w21, . . . ,wn11 },{w12,w22, . . . ,wn22 }, . . . ,{w1m,w2m, . . . ,wnmm }},
two worlds wki and w
l
j would then always be plan time indistinguishable, but only run time indistinguishable if i = j. This is
essentially equivalent to representing states as models of single-agent epistemic logic (see next section). Since we are anyway
going to generalise to multi-agent planning, we choose to move straight to epistemic logic, rather than consider this further
intermediate step.
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6 Epistemic logic
Let P be a finite set of atomic propositions (often we will take P to be the set of ground atoms of a
function-free first-order language as in the previous sections). Let A be a finite set of agents. The
epistemic language on P,A, denoted LKC(P,A), is generated by the following BNF:
ϕ ::=> | ⊥ | p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ϕ | Kiϕ |Cϕ,
where p ∈ P and i ∈A. We read Kiϕ as “agent i knows ϕ” and Cϕ as “it is common knowledge that ϕ”.
When P and A are clear from the context (or no assumptions about them are made), we will write LKC
for LKC(P,A). LK is the language LKC without the C modality.
Definition 4. Let P and A be as above. An epistemic model on P,A isM= (W,(∼i)i∈A,L) where
• The domain W is a non-empty finite set of worlds.
• ∼i ⊆W ×W is an equivalence relation called the indistinguishability relation for agent i ∈ A.8
• L : W → 2P is a labelling function assigning a propositional valuation (a set of propositions) to
each world.
For Wd ⊆W , the pair (M,Wd) is called an epistemic state (or simply a state), and the worlds of Wd
are called the designated worlds. A state is called global if Wd = {w} for some world w (called the
actual world), and we then often write (M,w) instead of (M,{w}). We use Sgl(P,A) to denote the set
of global states (or simply Sgl if P and A are clear from the context). For any state s = (M,Wd) we let
Globals(s) = {(M,w) |w∈Wd}. A state (M,Wd) is called a local state for agent i if Wd is closed under
∼i (that is, if w ∈Wd and w∼i v implies v ∈Wd). Given a state s = (M,Wd), the associated local state
of agent i, denoted si, is (M,{v | v∼i w and w ∈Wd}).
Definition 5. Let (M,Wd) be a state on P,A withM = (W,(∼i)i∈A,L). For i ∈ A, p ∈ P and ϕ,ψ ∈
LKC(P,A), we define truth as follows:
(M,Wd) |= ϕ iff (M,w) |= ϕ for all w ∈Wd
(M,w) |= p iff p ∈ L(w)
(M,w) |= ¬ϕ iff M,w 6|= ϕ
(M,w) |= ϕ ∧ψ iff M,w |= ϕ andM,w |= ψ
(M,w) |= Kiϕ iff (M,v) |= ϕ for all v∼i w
(M,w) |=Cϕ iff (M,v) |= ϕ for all v∼∗ w
where ∼∗ is the transitive closure of ⋃i∈A ∼i.
Note that a formula ϕ is defined to be true in a non-global state (M,Wd) iff it is true in each of the
global states (M,w), w∈Wd , it contains. This is consistent with our previous definition of truth in belief
states as truth in all worlds of that state.
Example 5. Let P = PL, where L is the function-free first-order language of Example 3 extended
with constant symbols PostOffice1 and PostOffice2 and let A = {Father}. Consider the initial state
s0 defined by (2). We can represent this via an epistemic model M = (W,∼Father,L) on P,A with
W = {w1,w2}, ∼Father = W ×W , L(w1) = {At(Father,Home),At(Present,PostOffice1)} and L(w2) =
8We will later consider generalising to non-equivalence relations, but for now it is sufficient ot make this simplification and
only consider equivalence relations.
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{At(Father,Home),At(Present,PostOffice2)}. Graphically, this epistemic model is represented as fol-
lows, using the abbreviations from earlier:
w1 : At(Father,H),At(Present,PO1) w2 : At(Father,H),At(Present,PO2)
Father
Here the nodes represent the worlds and the edges represent the indistinguishability relation (reflexive
edges left out). Each node is labelled by its name and the set of atomic propositions true at the world.
Consider the case where initially the present is at PostOffice2. This means that the actual world is w2,
and this situation can be represented by the global state s0 = (M,w2), that we graphically present as
s0 =
w1 : At(Father,H),At(Present,PO1) w2 : At(Father,H),At(Present,PO2)
Father
We use for designated worlds. The planning agent, Father, does not have access to this global state,
since he considers it equally possible that the present is at PO1 (w1 and w2 are indistinguishable to him).
The internal initial state of the father is his associated local state sFather0 = (M,W ):
sFather0 =
w1 : At(Father,H),At(Present,PO1) w2 : At(Father,H),At(Present,PO2)
Father
We have s |= At(Present,PO2) but sFather 6|= At(Present,PO2): From the outside global perspective (the
perspective of an omniscient external observer) it can initially be verified that the present is at PO2, but
not from the perspective of the planning agent, Father, himself.
In general, any belief state B = {s1, . . . ,sn} (set of propositional states) can be equivalently rep-
resented as an epistemic state ((W,∼,L),W ) with W = {w1, . . . ,wn}, ∼ = W ×W , L(wi) = si for all
i = 1, . . . ,n.
With epistemic models we can also capture the distinction between run time and plan time uncer-
tainty. When the father contemplates on the possible action sequences to execute in his local state sFather,
the epistemic state representing the result of executing the action sequence
Go(Father,H,PO1);TryPickUp(Father,Present,PO1);Go(Father,PO1,H)
will be
s′ =
w1 : At(Father,H),Has(Father,Present) w2 : At(Father,H),At(Present,PO2)
There is still two designated worlds: the agent do not at plan time know which one it will end up in. But
they are now not indistinguishable (there is no indistinguishability edge connecting them): at run time,
when the plan is executed, the agent will be able to tell whether it is in w1 or w2. In fact we have e.g.
s′ |= KFatherAt(Present,PO2)∨KFather¬At(Present,PO2): In s′, the father knows whether the present is
at PO2 or not. More generally, let s = (M,Wd) be any local state of an agent i ∈ A and let w1,w2 ∈Wd .
The worlds w1 and w2 are called run time indistinguishable (for agent i) if w1 ∼i w2. Otherwise, they
are plan time indistinguishable.
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The generalisation from belief states (in the standard AI sense of sets of propositional states [29])
to epistemic states (in the sense of epistemic logic) also allows us to represent planning tasks involving
multiple agents. E.g. the father might want to make sure that his daughter doesn’t get to know that he
has a present for her (it is supposed to be a surprise). In this case, we could reformulate the goal as
ϕg = At(Father,Home)∧Has(Father,Present)∧Wrapped(Present)∧¬KDaughterHas(Father,Present). (6)
7 Dynamic epistemic logic
Generalising from propositional states to epistemic states amounted to generalise from propositional
valuations to multisets of such valuations with an added indistinguishability relation for each agent. We
can now apply the exact same trick to generalise from propositional actions to epistemic actions. A
propositional action is an event 〈pre(a), post(a)〉, so an epistemic action will be a multiset of events
with an indistinguishability relation for each agent. This is exactly how epistemic actions are defined
in dynamic epistemic logic (DEL) with postconditions [12]. Such structures are called event models or
action models.
Definition 6. An action model on P,A is E = (E,(∼i)i∈A, pre, post) where
• The domain E is a non-empty finite set of events.
• ∼i ⊆ E×E is an equivalence relation called the indistinguishability relation for agent i ∈ A.
• pre : E→LKC(P,A) assigns a precondition to each event.
• post : E→LKC(P,A) assigns a postcondition to each event. For all e∈E, post(e) is a conjunction
of literals over P (including the special atom >).9
For Ed ⊆ E, the pair (E ,Ed) is called an epistemic action (or simply an action), and the events in Ed are
called the designated events. An action is called global if Ed = {e} for some event e, and we then often
write (E ,e) instead of (E ,{e}). Similar to states, (E ,Ed) is called a local action for agent i when Ed is
closed under ∼i. Given an action a = (E ,Ed), the associated local action of agent i ∈ A, denoted ai, is
(E ,{ f ∈ E | f ∼i e for some e ∈ Ed}).
Any propositional action a = 〈pre(a), post(a)〉 trivially induces an epistemic action (E ,{e}) with
E = ({e},{(e,e)}, pre, post) where pre(e) = pre(a) and post(e) = post(a).
Example 6. We can now finally, using action models, give a satisfactory formal representation of the
TryPickUp action of Section 5, cf. (3):
TryPickUp(agt,obj, from) =
e1 : 〈At(agt, from)∧At(obj, from)∧¬Has(agt,obj),
Has(agt,obj)∧¬At(obj, from)〉
e2 : 〈At(agt, from)∧¬At(obj, from),
>〉
9This definition of postconditions is slightly less general than the standard definition of postconditions in DEL [12]. Nor-
mally, post(e) is a mapping from atomic propositions to formulas LKC, where post(e)(p) = ϕ means that p after the event e
has occurred gets whatever truth value ϕ had before e occurred. In [12] it is shown that any action model can be equivalently
represented by one in which post(e)(p)∈ {p,>,⊥} for all e∈ E and p∈ P. This action model can potentially be exponentially
larger. Such simplified (but potentially larger) action models can immediately be translated into the form defined here (see [6]
for details). The advantages of the conventions of this paper is to have a more clear connection to the conventions of classical
planning and to simplify notation.
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We here use the same conventions for representing action models graphically as we did for epistemic
models. Note that there is no indistinguishability edge for Father: He will at run time observe whether
the action is succesful (e1) or not (e2). But at plan time he does not know which one it will be, which is
why both events are designated.
The state-transition function of DEL is called product update, and is denoted by an infix ⊗ symbol.
So instead of writing γ(s,a), one writes s⊗a.
Definition 7. Let a state s = (M,Wd) and an action a = (E ,Ed) be given with M = (W,(∼i)i∈A,L)
and E = (E,(∼i)i∈A, pre, post). Then the product update of s with a is s⊗a = ((W ′,(∼′i)i∈A,L′),W ′d)
where
• W ′ = {(w,e) ∈W ×E | (M,w) |= pre(e)}
• ∼′i = {((w,e),(w′,e′)) ∈W ′×W ′ | w∼i w′ and e∼i e′}
• L′(p) = (L(p)−{p | ¬p is a negative literal of post(e))∪{p | p is a positive literal of post(e)}
• W ′d = {(w,e) ∈W ′ | w ∈Wd and e ∈ Ed}.
We say that an action (E ,Ed) is applicable in a state (M,Wd) if for all w ∈Wd there is an event e ∈ Ed
such that (M,w) |= pre(e).
Note that this is the obvious generalisation to the epistemic setting of the state-transition function for
belief states and sets of events given in (4). In particular, if s′ is the epistemic state induced by a belief
state s, and a′ is the action model induced by a propositional action a, then s′⊗a′ is the epistemic state
induced by γ(s,a).
Let i ∈ A be an agent, let (M,Wd) be a local state for i and let (E ,Ed) be a local action for i.
Then (M,Wd) and (E ,Ed) represent agent i’s view on a particular state and action. According to the
definition above, the action (E ,Ed) is then applicable in the state (M,Wd) if, for any of the worlds agent
i considers possible (any world w in Wd), the action specifies at least one applicable event that agent i
considers possible (an event e in Ed with (M,w) |= pre(e)). In other words, the action is applicable from
the perspective of agent i.
8 Epistemic planning tasks
We now have all the necessary ingredients for defining planning tasks in epistemic planning based on
DEL. We simply define these as for propositional planning tasks, except we replace propositional ac-
tions by epistemic actions, propositional states by epistemic states and propositional goal formulas by
epistemic goal formulas.
Definition 8. An epistemic planning task on P,A is (A,s0,ϕg) where A is a finite set of epistemic
actions on P,A, s0 is an epistemic state on P,A, and ϕg ∈ LKC(P,A). We say that (A,s0,ϕg) is an
epistemic planning task for agent i ∈ A if s0 and all a ∈ A are local for i. A planning task (A,s0,ϕg) is
called global if s0 is global. Given any planning task Π= (A,s0,ϕg), the associated local planning task
of agent i, denoted Πi, is ({ai | a ∈ A},si0,ϕg).10
An epistemic planning task (A,s0,ϕg) induces a classical planning task ((S,A,γ),s0,Sg) in a similar
manner to propositional planning tasks:
10Given a planning task Π, the planning task Πi is agent i’s local perspective on that planning task. E.g. if the present is at
PO1, then from an outside perspective, the planning task has an initial state where only the world satisfyingAt(Present,PO1) is
designated, but agent Father is still forced to do planning based on the planning taskΠFather where both the At(Present,PO1)-
world and the At(Present,PO2)-world are designated, since the father doesn’t know which of the two is the actual initial state.
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• S = {s0⊗a1⊗·· ·⊗an | n ∈ N and a1, . . . ,an ∈ A}
• γ(s,a) =
{
s⊗a if a is applicable in s
undefined otherwise
• Sg = {s ∈ S | s |= ϕg}.
As for propositional planning tasks, we can then define a solution to an epistemic planning task (A,s0,ϕg)
to be a solution to the induced classical planning task. This is equivalent to the existence of a sequence
of actions a1; · · · ;an from A such that each ai is applicable in s0⊗ a1⊗·· ·⊗ ai−1 (i ≤ n) and s0⊗ a1⊗
·· ·⊗an |= ϕg.
Example 7. Let us provide a full formalisation of the birthday present example as an epistemic plan-
ning task. The epistemic action TryPickUp was presented in Example 6. The actions Go(agt, from, to)
and Wrap(agt,obj) are simply the ones induced by their propositional counterparts. The initial state is
the state sFather0 of Example 5. The goal formula is ϕg = At(Father,Home)∧Has(Father,Present)∧
Wrapped(Present). Clearly the resulting planning task is a planning task for agent Father. We now get
s1 = sFather0 ⊗Go(Father,H,PO1) =
At(Father,PO1),
At(Present,PO1)
At(Father,PO1),
At(Present,PO2)
Father
s2 = s1⊗TryPickUp(Father,Present,PO1) = At(Father,PO1),Has(Father,Present)
At(Father,PO1),
At(Present,PO2)
Note that the indistinguishability link between the two worlds is being cut when going from s1 to s2,
since the two events of TryPickUp are distinguishable. We further get
s3 = s2⊗Go(Father,PO1,PO2) = At(Father,PO2),
Has(Father,Present)
At(Father,PO2),
At(Present,PO2)
s4 = s3⊗TryPickUp(Father,Present,PO2) = At(Father,PO2),
Has(Father,Present)
At(Father,PO2),
Has(Father,Present)
s6 = s4⊗Go(Father,PO2,H)⊗Wrap(Father,Present) =
At(Father,Home),
Has(Father,Present)
Wrapped(Present)
At(Father,Home),
Has(Father,Present)
Wrapped(Present)
Since the two worlds of s6 have identical labels, we can take the bisimulation contraction which will
preserve only one of them.11 We clearly have s5 |= ϕg. Hence the action sequence (5) above is a solution
to the epistemic planning task. We could actually replace the TryPickUp(Father,Present,PO2) action in
this plan with the epistemic action induced by the original non-conditional PickUp(Father,Present,PO2)
action. This is because the father will know that the present is at PO2 when he gets there (since it wasn’t
at PO1).
11For a definition of bisimulation between epistemic models with multiple designated points, see [6]. For a definition of
bisimulation on models of modal logic in general, and a definition of bisimulation contraction, see [4]. Bisimulation contrac-
tions are an indispensible tool in practice when working with product updates in DEL, since sequences of updates otherwise
tend to produce very large model.
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9 Conditional epistemic planning
The plan found in the previous example, Example 7, is clearly not always optimal. If the father gets the
present already at PO1, there is no need to go to PO2 as well. So in this case the father will be able to
reach the goal in 4 instead of 6 steps. But the father will of course not know this until run time (after
having attempted to pick up the present at PO1). A sequential plan (sequence of actions) can not capture
this, since it has a fixed number of actions, independent of the action outcomes. So we need to move to
conditional plans (not to be confused with conditional actions that we already have). A conditional plan
for the current planning task could e.g. be formulated as the following program
Go(Father,H,PO1);TryPickUp(Father,Present,PO1);
if KFatherHas(Father,Present) then Go(Father,PO1,H);Wrap(Father,Present) else
Go(Father,PO1,PO2);TryPickUp(Father,Present,PO2);Go(Father,PO2,H);
Wrap(Father,Present)
Such programs for epistemic planning tasks are formally defined and explored in [1] (single-agent case
only).12 Alternatively, such programs can be seen as abbreviations of PDL programs, e.g. the program
if ϕ then pi1 else pi2 can be seen as shorthand for the PDL program (ϕ?;pi1)∪(¬ϕ?;pi2). In [13], dynamic
epistemic logic with postconditions and PDL constructs is studied (however not in a planning context).
Programs like the one above are in [15] called knowledge-based programs and are there studied in an
alternative logical setting. Knowledge-based programs are studied in a planning context in [23].
An alternative to conditional plans as programs is policies. A policy is a mapping from states into
actions, that is, for each state the policy specifies the action chosen in that state (a policy is also sometimes
called a strategy or a protocol, depending on the area). Since implemented planning systems often
generate conditional plans via an AND-OR graph search in the state space, a policy comes as a more
direct output of these algorithms than a program (e.g. one does not have to synthesise appropriate if-
conditions). From now on we will only consider conditional plans as policies, not programs.
Definition 9. Let Π = (A,s0,ϕg) be a planning task and i ∈ A be an agent. An i-policy pi for Π is a
partial mapping pi : Sgl ↪→ A from global states into actions such that
(1) If pi(s) = a then a is applicable in si.
(2) If si = t i then pi(s) = pi(t).
An i-policy is a policy from the perspective of agent i. Condition (1) ensures that in such a policy,
agent i always knows that the next action to be performed is applicable (knowledge of preconditions).
Condition (2) is a uniformity condition: If two global states are indistinguishable to agent i, agent i has
to make the same choice in both.
Definition 10. An execution of a policy pi from a global state s0 is a maximal (finite or infinite) sequence
of alternating global states and actions (s0,a1,s1,a2,s2, . . .) such that for all m≥ 0,
(1) pi(sm) = am+1, and
(2) sm+1 ∈ Globals(sm⊗am+1).
12Note that the if-condition of the if-then-else construct is a K-formula expressing knowledge of the planning
agent (Father). All such if-conditions are required to be K-formulas of the planning agent, as an agent can
only make a choice based on what he knows. Otherwise we could simply construct a conditional plan like
if At(Present,PO1) then Go(Father,Home,PO1) else Go(Father,Home,PO2). However, in this case the agent would not
know how to settle the truth-value of the if-condition At(Present,PO1) in the initial state, and would hence not know whether
to execute Go(Father,Home,PO1) or Go(Father,Home,PO2).
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An execution is called successful for a global planning task Π = (A,s0,ϕg) if it is a finite execution
(s0,a1,s1, . . . ,an,sn) such that sn |= ϕg.
Definition 11. A policy pi for a planning task Π= (A,s0,ϕg) is called a solution to Π if Globals(s0)⊆
Dom(pi) and for each s ∈ Dom(pi), any execution of pi from s is successful for Π.13
Example 8. In the birthday present task we can now specify distinct actions to be performed in the two
distinct global states of the state s2 of Example 7 (the state after the father has attempted to pickup the
present at PO1):
pi( At(Father,PO1),
Has(Father,Present)
At(Father,PO1),
At(Present,PO2)
) = Go(Father,PO1,Home)
pi( At(Father,PO1),
Has(Father,Present)
At(Father,PO1),
At(Present,PO2)
) = Go(Father,PO1,PO2).
This partial policy can easily be extended into a full solution policy to the planning task.
Example 9. Consider extending the birthday present example with a post office employee, Employee,
working at PO1. We can think of this as a new agent, so now A = {Father,Employee}. It might be
possible to call the employee from home to ask whether the present is at the post office. We can assume
the employee knows whether the present is at his or her post office, so the initial state would be the
same as in Example 7 (sFather0 ), except there is now reflexive loops for Employee at both worlds. We can
now represent a general action of an agent i calling an agent j to ask whether a formula ϕ is true as the
following action, where i, j ∈ A and ϕ ∈ LKC:
Ask(i, j,ϕ) = 〈K jϕ,>〉 〈K j¬ϕ,>〉 〈¬K jϕ ∧¬K j¬ϕ,>〉
The action model above corresponds to agent j giving a sincere answer to the question “is ϕ true?”. Agent
j saying “yes” to the question is represented by the event e1, that is, it corresponds to an announcement
that agent j knows ϕ . Event e2 corresponds to saying “no”, and e3 corresponds to saying “I don’t know”.
We now get
sFather0 ⊗Ask(Father,Employee,At(Present,PO1)) =
At(Father,H),
At(Present,PO1)
At(Father,Home),
At(Present,PO2)
This is because in w1 of sFather0 we have that KEmployeeAt(Present,PO1) holds and in w2 of s
Father
0 we
have KEmployee¬At(Present,PO1), and the action model for Ask(Father,Employee,At(Present,PO1))
13Note that a solution policy has to lead to successful executions for all global states in s0 (and for all global states along
all possible executions of the policy). Such policies are often called strong policies, because the requirement is that they are
guaranteed to succeed under alle circumstances (considered possible by the planning agent). In conditional planning, one often
also considers weak solutions (weak policies) that have a possibility of succeeding, but might not always succeed. A weak
solution to the birthday present task would be to go to PO1, attempt picking up the present there, go home, and then wrap the
present if one has it. This plan can clearly fail if the present is at PO2. In this paper we restrict attention to strong solutions.
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is clearly seen to cut the link between worlds satisfying KEmployee¬At(Present,PO1) and worlds sat-
isfying KEmployee¬At(Present,PO1) (since there are two distinguishable events with these formulas as
preconditions). Hence the planning agent, Father, can conclude
s0⊗Ask(Father,Employee,At(Present,PO1)) |= KFatherAt(Present,PO1)∨KFatherAt(Present,PO2)
and hence that he can first call to ask the post office employee whether she has the present, and then next
he will know where to go.
10 Public and private actions
The Ask action above is a bit simplified. It is publicly observable: the indistinguishability relation is
the identity. When there is only two agents in the scenario this is acceptable, since they can only call
each other, but if there were more agents present, these would probably not observe the phone call taking
place. Consider adding a third agent, Employee2, working at PostOffice2. If Father calls Employee,
Employee2 will not know, and might not even consider it possible that the phone call could have taken
place. To model this we have to go beyond equivalence classes in epistemic models and action models,
since now it becomes possible to have false beliefs, e.g. a false belief that no phone call took place (or a
false belief that Father does not yet know At(Present,PO2)). In this case, we could model the private
phone call of agent i to agent j asking about ϕ as follows:
Ask(i, j,ϕ) =
〈K jϕ,>〉 〈K j¬ϕ,>〉 〈¬K jϕ ∧¬K j¬ϕ,>〉
〈>,>〉
A−{i, j} A−{i, j} A−{i, j}
This models that agent i and j know the phone call takes place (and know the outcome of the phone call),
but all other agents think that nothing has happened (the skip event 〈>,>〉). We can even model that
some subset B ⊆A of agents hear the question being asked, but not the answer (they are together with i,
but cannot hear what is being said in the other end):
Ask(i, j,ϕ) =
〈K jϕ,>〉 〈K j¬ϕ,>〉 〈¬K jϕ ∧¬K j¬ϕ,>〉
〈>,>〉
A−{i, j}−B A−{i, j}−B A−{i, j}−B
B B
These examples illustrate that designing action models to represent actions under multi-agent partial
observability is far from a trivial matter. Some recent papers try to propose different ways of encoding
observability information into a logical language, so that the action models themselves can become
simpler, more uniform, and automatically induced from the underlying observability information [5, 7,
18]. However, there are still many unsolved problems in this area.
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The possibility of representing private actions (only observed by a subset of agents, whereas the
other agents believe nothing happens) is also what allows us to model the full version of the birthday
present example, where the daughter does not get to know that the father has the present. We can for
instance model that only agents who are copresent (in the same location) can observe actions taking place
in that location (see [10] for a discussion and treatment of copresence in an epistemic planning setting).
For instance, the Wrap action could be reformulated as follows:
Wrap(agt,obj, loc) =
〈At(agt, loc)∧Has(agt,obj)∧¬Wrapped(obj),
Wrapped(obj)〉
〈>,>〉
{i : ¬At(i, loc)}i∈A
We here use a new type of action model that we call an edge-conditioned action model [5]. The meaning
of the label on the edge is that there is an edge for agent i here if ¬At(i, loc) is true (agent i is not present
in the location where the present is being wrapped). Such edge-conditioned action models are a variant
of generalised arrow updates [22].
With the wrapping action presented as above, the father will e.g. be able to figure out that if the
daughter is at home (At(Daughter,Home) is true), then only the plan where he executes Wrap at the
post office will lead to Wrapped(Present)∧¬KDaughterHas(Father,Present) (recall the state-transition
system in Figure 2 that shows that the present can either be wrapped in the post office or at home).
11 Multi-agent planning
So far we have only considered the case of a single agent planning in the presence of other agents. The
formal framework of course also allows to represent real multi-agent planning tasks. However, for true
multi-agent planning a lot of additional design choices have to be made. Are the agents collaborating
or competing? Are there coalitions of agents trying to achieve a joint goal, perhaps against the agents
outside the coalition? Can the agents communicate and coordinate arbitrarily when coming up with a
plan, and will they commit to such a joint plan? The papers [14, 8] look at implicitly coordinated plans,
where agents have a joint goal but are not allowed to coordinate or negotiate in advance. All coordination
should happen during plan executions as a result of announcements and observing the actions of others.
In the birthday present example it could e.g. be that Father calls Employee to announce the goal
Has(Father,Present). Assuming Employee is altruistic and adopts this as his or her own goal, Fa-
ther and Employee are now engaged in planning with implicit coordination towards the joint goal
Has(Father,Present). Assume the present is at PostOffice2. Since Employee knows that Father doesn’t
know the location of the present, and that he cannot get the present unless he knows, she will choose to
announce that the present is at PostOffice2. This is a case of implicit coordination: The father doesn’t
ask the employee about the location of the present, but the employee knows about the goal and can still
plan to inform him, in order to allow him to plan the rest of the required actions. These ideas are explored
further in [14, 8].
12 (Un)decidability and complexity
One of the most studied problems in epistemic planning based on DEL is the complexity of the plan ex-
istence problems. The plan existence problem for a class of planning tasks X is the following decision
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problem: Given a planning task Π ∈ X , does there exist a solution to Π? So far only the complexity of
deciding whether a sequential plan exists have been studied. For general epistemic planning tasks the
problem is undecidable already with two agents, no common knowledge, and even without postcondi-
tions (that is, purely epistemic planning without ontic change) [2]. This has lead to a quest for finding
decidable, but still reasonably expressive, fragments of epistemic planning. The first result along these
lines proved that epistemic planning with propositional preconditions (that is, no epistemic formulas in
the preconditions) is decidable [31]. An upper bound on complexity is in that paper shown to be (n+1)-
EXPTIME for planning tasks in which the goal formula has modal depth n. In [11] it is shown that when
the preconditions are propositional and there are no postconditions, then the plan existence problem is
PSPACE-complete (for arbitrary goal formulas). If restricting further to certain types of actions, like
private and public announcements, complexity of plan existence goes further down to NP-complete [9].
13 Alternative approaches to epistemic planning
Epistemic planning based on DEL takes a semantic approach, where states are represented as semantical
objects, epistemic states. It is also possible to take a syntactic approach, where states are represented as
knowledge-bases, sets of formulas known to be true. Interestingly, STRIPS and propositional planning
are semantic and syntactic at the same time, since in propositional logic a semantic state is just a set of
formulas (a set of true atomic propositions). This means that when generalising from STRIPS or propo-
sitional planning to epistemic planning, it is not immediately obvious whether a semantic or syntactic
approach would be most appropriate. Both approaches have their strength and weaknesses.
Epistemic planning based on DEL also takes the approach of insisting on succinct action represen-
tations via action models. We argued in favour of this approach already very early in the paper by
mentioning the weaknesses of attempting to represent planning tasks explicitly as state-transition sys-
tems. In fact, the state-transition systems induced by epistemic planning tasks will often be infinite, so
even if choosing a state-transition system based approach, one will need a way to represent them finitely
in order to be able to do planning based on them [20]. From the perspective of classical planning, the
most appropriate approach to representing state-transition systems compactly seems to be representing
the actions themselves in a compact way (using some kind of action models or action schemas).
Based on the above, we can distinguish approaches to epistemic planning along two dimensions:
• Semantic approaches versus syntactic approaches.
• Action model based approaches versus state-transition system based approaches.
The approach of this paper is, as mentioned, semantic and action model based. Syntactic approaches to
epistemic planning can be found in e.g. the (single-agent) PKS planner [27], the (multi-agent) planning
framework of [25] and the compilation approach of [21], translating a restricted fragment of epistemic
planning into classical planning. The state-transition system based approach is found in a number of
papers in temporal epistemic logic, e.g. [19, 20]. In these papers, the planning domains are represented
by a type of epistemic state-transition system called a concurrent epistemic game structure (CEGS).
Having an explicitly represented state-transition system like a CEGS tends to make it easier to define
complex notions of multi-agent plans (strategies). On the other hand, by working directly with state-
transition systems, some of the important problems of epistemic planning are being silently bypassed.
These problems include compact representations of the state-transition system, and efficient heuristics
for avoiding to build the entire state-transition system when planning. They also include problems of
how to provide a general approach to multi-agent observability and problems of concurrent composition
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of actions of multiple agents. In CEGS, transitions represent joint actions, one action per agent. The
problem of how to make a parallel composition of the actions of the individual agents has to be solved
before one can even build the CEGS for a given planning domain. In epistemic planning based on DEL,
this problem has to be solved at the level of action models: How do we make a parallel composition
of two action models in case they are not independent (e.g. two agents trying to open a door at the
same time, but from opposite sides). Epistemic planning tasks can be seen as inducing e.g. forests of
epistemic temporal logic [3] or CEGSs. The exact relations have not been explored yet, but providing a
link between the action model based approaches and the state-transition system based approaches could
be very valuable and provide a possibility of getting the best of both worlds.
Similarly, providing links and connections between syntactic and semantic approaches seem to be
potentially very valuable. In a semantic approach, one is essentially modelling ignorance: the more
ignorance, the bigger the state. In a syntactic approach, one is essentially modelling knowledge: the
more knowledge, the bigger the state. Knowledge and ignorance are each others duals, and hence the
semantic and the syntactic approach are also each others duals. It seems that when humans are planning,
we are sometimes using a more semantic approach, and sometimes a more syntactic one, depending on
the planning task at hand. It would hence also be very interesting to see whether planning frameworks
could be developed that would employ or combine both approaches.
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